



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**HOW CAN OFFICERS BE BETTER PREPARED TO
INTERACT WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS IN A POST-CONFLICT
ENVIRONMENT?**

by

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September 2011

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ENVIRONMENT?**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the state of relations between the military and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It argues that the military–NGO relationship requires improvement. The involvement of the military in post-conflict reconstruction efforts is required due to the tenuous security situation and an increased in military–NGO cooperation/coordination is necessary in order to achieve stabilization of the post-conflict society. This thesis supports the argument that an effective way of increasing cooperation/coordination is by improving the preparation of military officers who are expected to operate in that cooperative environment.

This research will first consider the effectiveness of existing practices for preparing military officers for NGO interaction and will provide recommendations for improving this preparation through the utilization of an anonymous survey provided to a cross-organizational audience. The lessons learned as a result of this research, will provide a foundation for military decision-makers to properly allocate funding towards these efforts.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

COCOM	Combatant Commands
COE	Center for Excellence in Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CSRS	Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
DDR	Disarmament, Demilitarization, and Reintegration
DENCAP	Dental Civil Affairs Program
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
IRB	Institutional Review Board
MEDCAP	Medical Civil Affairs Program
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RELIEF	Research & Experimentation for Local & International Emergency & First Responders
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USPACOM	United States Pacific Command

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis explores what can be done to prepare officers being assigned to post-conflict reconstruction operations positions. Officers who are assigned to positions involved in post-conflict reconstruction have the opportunity to read literature, as well as to participate in briefings, workshops, formal education, and cooperative exercises designed to provide a better understanding of the post-conflict environment in terms of the role of military–NGO cooperation and coordination. However, despite attempts to improve military–NGO cooperation, there is room for additional improvement in this area. This thesis will examine ways to improve cooperation by improving the preparation military officers receive prior to participating in post-conflict reconstruction operations. This thesis will address the question, “How can officers be better prepared to interact with non-governmental organizations in a post-conflict environment?”

B. IMPORTANCE

The United States military is currently involved in two major reconstruction efforts (Iraq and Afghanistan), in addition to numerous smaller efforts (East Timor, Haiti, etc.). The requirement that the military operate effectively in a reconstruction environment is now more important than ever. This has been recognized by the Department of Defense (DoD), which set the directive that the department is to “be prepared to conduct stability operations with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” This point was first made in DoD Directive 3000.05 in November 2005, and reaffirmed in DoD Instruction 3000.05 in September 2009.¹ Reconstruction operations, if conducted properly, require the coordination of the military and NGOs.

The recently published National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy all discuss the importance of organizations working

¹ U.S. DoD Directive 3000.05 (Washington DC, November 28, 2005), 2. and U.S. DoD Instruction 3000.05 (Washington, DC, September 16, 2009), 2.

together. The National Security Strategy describes the “Whole of Government” approach as requiring the integration of the DoD with all other governmental entities in order to properly leverage resources and capabilities.² The National Military Strategy provides a second approach, the “Whole of Nation” approach, which emphasizes that the military not only needs to be better integrated with other government entities, but also with non-governmental entities. These non-governmental entities consist of industry, the media, and NGOs.³ This “Whole of Nation” approach emphasizes the importance of improving military–NGO relations.

C. HYPOTHESIS

This thesis tests three hypotheses. First, military involvement is required in the post-conflict environment due to the tenuous security situation, the fact that this situation is sometimes the result of military action, and the military involvement in the transition from conflict to post-conflict. Second, military–NGO cooperation is necessary to achieve a stabilized environment and that this is an area that requires attention and improvement. Third, military officers assigned to post-conflict reconstruction operations are not properly prepared for military–NGO cooperation and that by improving the military officers’ preparation, they will have a better understanding of the environment. This will in turn result in their being better able to interact with NGOs, leading to increased cooperation as NGO personnel begin to recognize the military officers’ more cooperative and understanding stance.

D. METHODOLOGY

This thesis built upon the following research efforts in order to provide recommendations for improving the state of military–NGO cooperation.

The first element of this research is a literature review that provides a summary of the existing knowledge on the topic of military–NGO cooperation; the goals of this

² Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC, 2010), 14.

³ Michael Mullin, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC, 2011), 6.

literature review are to identify and explain the current state of cooperation, to highlight measures being taken in order to improve cooperation, and to consider existing criticism of these measures.

The second element is the distribution and analysis of a survey targeted at people with relevant experience, in order to obtain their opinions and impressions of current practices as well as to solicit recommendations that could be used in the future. The survey was designed to validate the themes and conclusions discovered in the literature review, by presenting them to field personnel as a means of testing the previously-stated hypotheses.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter II includes a literature review of the existing publications that address the topic. Chapter III discusses the development and distribution of the survey. Chapter IV summarizes the findings of the survey and provides an interpretation of the results. Chapter V draws conclusions from both the literature and the survey and includes recommendations for practices with particular attention paid to effectiveness, cost, and return on investment.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter examines military and academic publications in order to present a background to the present situation, existing cooperation efforts, current mindsets, criticism for and against increasing coordination, and previous recommendations.

A. INTRODUCTION

The military and NGOs each have specific mindsets, capabilities, and convictions regarding assistance to conflict-affected communities; however, they are often forced to operate cooperatively in order to provide a comprehensive solution to reconstruction efforts in a post-conflict environment. Previous efforts at cooperation cover a large span of time and have had varying levels of success. Notable examples include the reconstruction efforts of the post-World War II Marshall Plan in Germany and the Vietnam War-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).

Currently, the military is involved in reconstruction efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan, where it is facing complications in military–NGO cooperation. In order to understand these challenges, this section provides a brief history of NGO development.

B. THE EVOLVING POLITICAL WORLD

In summarizing international relations theory, it has traditionally been believed that the state is the fundamental unit of sovereignty and that it alone has a monopoly on force and coercion within its territory. The state was viewed as being responsible for the protection of its citizens and its self-preservation. This viewpoint is known as the Realist Theory in and is commonly used to explain decision-making in international relations. This theory posits that military force is the “leverage” that is applied to international relations and that political decisions are made in a constant state of possible war. This forces states to view the international system and their position or security in the context of relative advantages to the other state actors. This viewpoint in turn leads states to build

up military power in an effort to guarantee national survival. According to Realist Theory states will recognize other states' military power and act correspondingly.

While Realist Theory is commonly accepted, it is unable to explain global events and international relations in their entirety, which led to the development of other theories. Liberalism proposed that international relations decisions were based on international cooperation among non-state organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), and the world economy. While these are not considered established states, they are institutions that require attention when world leaders make decisions. Liberalism suggests that states view the world in terms of absolute gains and the potential for every state to develop through cooperation and mutual well-being.

The Theory of Constructivism considers that ideas and norms are the deciding factors in international relations decisions. Regarding humanitarian aid, Constructivists would argue that countries participate in humanitarian actions because it is the right and moral thing to do.⁴

C. THE APPEARANCE OF NGOs ON THE GLOBAL SCENE

As the theories of Liberalism and Constructivism gained prominence, state and non-state actors came to recognize that the state is not the sole source of power and influence. This has resulted in an increase in NGO participation on the global scene. An NGO is defined as “an organization that is a legally constituted entity created by private organizations or people with no participation in or representation of any government.”⁵

These organizations are often well-financed, properly staffed, and focused on remedying a specific problem that they believe requires attention. They look solutions that are not being provided by existing institutions. They are not tied to any government and receive the majority of their funding from private donations. While some NGOs

⁴Allison Stanger, *One Nation Under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 39–42.

⁵Grey Frandsen, *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military*, ed. Lynn Lawry (Washington, DC: CDHAM and IHD, Summer 2009), 15.

receive government funds in support of their mission area, their funding typically comes with few or no strings attached, which allows NGOs to operate with few impediments.

In the wake of globalization and the erosion of state powers, international organizations and influences (the United Nations, international corporations, the world economy, etc.) have become increasingly influential. This has allowed NGOs to become an outlet for private citizens, and coalitions of citizens, to further their dreams of impacting society in a positive manner. NGOs represent a means of providing a better situation for people or cultures that are in some way impoverished, displaced, or oppressed. NGOs typically operate in underdeveloped countries, trying to provide education, health care, or development in order to improve society and the global environment. They are best known for their assistance following natural disasters (earthquakes, typhoons, floods, etc.) and their ability to provide shelter, food, water, and stability to people in serious need. They are increasingly visible in conflict and post-conflict environments, as they possess the desire and ability to provide the relief, in addition to supporting nation building.

1. Examples of NGOs

Three examples of NGOs are described in the following subsections as a way of providing some details for the generalizations made later in this chapter. The discussion of these NGOs includes the location of their headquarters, geographic operating environment, annual revenues, focus sectors, and a brief summary of their actions. These three NGOs were selected because they show a cross-section of the NGO community; in addition, two of them will be discussed later in this paper, regarding their position on military integration.

a. OXFAM International and OXFAM America

OXFAM is headquartered in Oxford, England. Founded in 1942, it participates in worldwide relief efforts. OXFAM operates with annual revenues of

approximately \$2.6 billion and focuses on alleviating poverty, suffering, and injustice.⁶ OXFAM America is an affiliate of OXFAM International; it is headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, and operates in North America, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia. It has an operating budget of \$68 million and focuses on issues relating to gender, microfinance, and human rights protection.

Oxfam America is an international relief and development organization that creates lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and injustice. Together with individuals and local groups more than 120 countries, Oxfam saves lives, helps people overcome poverty, and fights for social justice.⁷

b. Doctors Without Borders

Doctors Without Borders is headquartered out of Geneva, Switzerland, founded in 1971, and operates in more than 70 countries worldwide. It has an operating budget of \$714 million and its goal is to provide assistance to “populations in distress, to victims of natural or manmade disasters and to victims of armed conflict, without discrimination and irrespective of race, religion, creed, or political affiliation.”⁸

c. Project HOPE

Project HOPE is headquartered out of Millwood, Virginia, and operates in Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific. It operates with annual revenues of approximately \$200 thousand and focuses on health and education.

Project HOPE is unique among international organizations in that we have always worked across the health spectrum in a wide variety of settings—from the family and community levels to the tertiary care level—training traditional birth attendants and community health volunteers where resources are limited and cardiac surgeons and biomedical engineers where technology is appropriate. Though the challenges have evolved,

⁶Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History* (New York: Longman, 2009), 247.

⁷Frandsen, *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military*, 285.

⁸Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts*, 246.

Project HOPE remains as committed as ever to addressing the world's new health threats by playing a leadership role—forging new alliances among those on the frontlines of health and together seek new solutions.⁹

Note: According to financial information found on the Project HOPE Website, the 2010 operating budget is \$62 million, used as described in the Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military.¹⁰

d. Summary of Examples

There is a variety of NGOs that operate in every environment around the globe, each having different (although at times similar) objectives, methods, funds availability, and desires for coordination. As international relations have shifted away from the state-centric power model, individuals and non-state actors have become more powerful and capable than ever. NGOs have the capacity to accomplish things that state governments and militaries cannot. It is for this reason that NGO integration into the national security strategy must be considered.

2. NGO Coordination Efforts

It has been claimed that NGOs are unique because of their ability to operate without bureaucratic red tape, to focus on a single issue, to become subject matter experts, and to develop the local population's trust. However, these characteristics may also lead to an inability to understand the “big picture” or to coordinate effectively in order to solve large, complex challenges. There are thousands of NGOs, each with its own vision, perspective, and priorities, a situation that creates challenges for inter-NGO coordination.

Because each NGO has its own funding sources and focus area, getting NGOs to coordinate becomes increasingly difficult. There are corresponding increases in the intensity of the situation (number of refugees, casualties, intensity of violence, etc.), the

⁹Frandsen, *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military*, 293.

¹⁰http://www.projecthope.org/site/DocServer/Final_FS_FY10.pdf?docID=481, accessed on December 10, 2010.

number of NGOs participating in the environment, and the range of outlooks among the organizations participating in the response. As these factors increase, which is very common in the post-conflict environment, it is reasonable to expect that the presence of various NGOs focusing on multiple small issues will result in overall reconstruction efforts suffering as NGOs become counterproductive due to a lack of organization.

In response, some type of coordination is usually undertaken as a way of making sure that the organizations at least agree on basic priorities and procedures, in order to deliver services to those who require assistance. In the past, this coordination was accomplished at the lowest level via face-to-face meetings and coordination in the field. However, in the global environment where so many organizations are involved, it is not feasible to achieve successful coordination of a large-scale effort while using only small-scale methods.

a. Host Nation Systems

While it is true that there has been a rise in the globalization of relief efforts, the host nation remains the ultimate authority on what assistance is provided and the manner in which it is delivered. Some nations create an office that assumes responsibility for long-term development coordination once the crisis has been handled and the government is in a position to direct aid efforts. An example of this is the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission which was established within the Sudanese government and that is responsible for "the repatriation, relief, resettlement, rehabilitation, [and] reintegration of returnees and internally displaced persons as well as the facilitation of the reconstruction of the conflict affected areas." This commission coordinates any efforts, including those of NGOs, to provide assistance.¹¹

b. The United Nations – The Cluster System

There are some situations in which the host nation is overwhelmed by conflict and the aid response. This situation then renders the host nation incapable of

¹¹http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/gov/goss_commissions_institutions.asp#Revenue, accessed on December 10, 2010.

coordinating assistance efforts. In these predicaments, the host nation can request that the UN assume responsibility for coordination of the various entities, while still being included in decision-making and providing direction.

In order to establish a system for coordinating aid efforts the UN developed a framework that could be applied to any crisis response. This system is known as the “cluster system” and while it has had its critics,¹² its creation in 2005 represented a revolutionary step towards the integration of humanitarian aid organizations. Prior to the shift to the cluster system, it was recognized that while the quality of aid delivered to local populations was being impacted by inefficiencies caused by a lack of coordination among inter-organizational efforts, there was no framework for coordinating aid. The cluster system was created in an effort to provide an organizational umbrella that could include all organizations in a functional structure, with a UN office acting as the lead agency. It originally consisted of nine clusters; this number later grew to eleven. These clusters are Protection, Camp Coordination and Management, Water Sanitation and Hygiene, Health, Emergency Shelter, Nutrition, Emergency Telecommunications, Logistics, Early Recovery, Education, and Agriculture.¹³

When a crisis is declared, the UN, utilizing the cluster system, attempts to integrate all applicable governmental and non-governmental agencies. The UN Interagency Standing Committee provides the basic framework and vision for the cluster system, but its greatest value is that it can be adapted to varied scenarios by operatives in the field.¹⁴ For example, while the framework includes a total of eleven clusters, in Afghanistan only eight of these have been implemented; Logistics, Early Recovery, and Camp Coordination and Management have not been established, as there are already-existing offices that are capable of facilitating proper coordination (i.e., ISAF).

¹²Lydia Geirsdottir, HRO Afghanistan. *NGO and Humanitarian Reform Project: Assessment of the Afghanistan Kabul-based Humanitarian Coordination Mechanisms June–September 2009*, www.icva.ch/doc00004020.doc, accessed on August 18, 2011, 1–6.

¹³<http://unmit.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=760>, accessed on December 10, 2010.

¹⁴UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee Report on Operational Guidance on Designating Sector/Cluster Leads in Major New Emergencies, Geneva, May 23, 2007.

The cluster system is generally accepted as a good idea in principle, but there has been criticism of its the execution. Critics claims that the cluster system is incapable of gathering applicable data in order to measure needs and response effectiveness, lacks control of all organizations within a cluster, and lacks the ability to coordinate in an inter-cluster manner.

While this framework has been established and sanctioned by the UN, there is no requirement for NGOs to operate within the cluster system. It is purely voluntary, which means that inefficiencies and counter-productiveness in the humanitarian aid delivery system remain and that these continue to cause inefficiencies.¹⁵

c. NGO Self-Coordination

There is disagreement within the NGO community regarding priorities and methods, but there is a growing recognition that only through cooperation is it possible to deliver aid efficiently. Some NGOs choose not to participate within the cluster system, and some crisis situations see no UN involvement. In response to this, some NGOs have been created to help facilitate inter-NGO cooperation. A prime example of this is the NGO called “InterAction.” InterAction was created with an acknowledgement that cooperation is the only truly effective way of providing aid. This is highlighted by the comments below, which are taken from InterAction’s website.

InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S.-based international NGOs; these organizations are focused on the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. Its vision statement reads:

At InterAction, we recognize that our global challenges are interconnected and that we can’t tackle any of them without addressing all of them. That’s why we create a forum for leading NGOs, global thought leaders and policymakers to address our challenges collectively. Leveraging our shared expertise, on-the-ground insights from our 200 member

¹⁵Geirsdottir, 3–4.

organizations and strategic analyses of the foreign aid budget, we deliver a bold, new agenda to end global poverty and deliver humanitarian aid in every developing country.¹⁶

d. Summary of NGO Coordination Efforts

It should be recognized that NGO coordination is difficult and while there are existing networks, frameworks, and organizations that have been developed to ease the difficulty, there are still personality conflicts and differences in vision among the NGO community that may prevent complete cooperation. In addition to those basic reasons, the fact that, despite the existence of multiple coordination agencies, none of them can require NGOs to participate clouds the humanitarian aid situation even more.

D. THE CHANGING NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION ENVIRONMENT

Well-respected NGOs have earned their reputations by being active in crisis and post-crisis environments. These crises can arise from conflicts such as interstate wars, intrastate wars, and genocides, or from natural disasters such as earthquakes, famines, and floods. Historically, NGO disaster recovery operations generally consisted of responding to a disaster to provide immediate assistance and then returning responsibility for reconstruction to host nations; however, this is not the current common operating scenario. Emergencies have become more complicated. For example, if the U.S. wishes to provide aid to flood-affected areas of Pakistan it must consider possible domestic political repercussions; NGO actions must take force protection issues into consideration when operating in the hostile environment in Afghanistan; and international community providing food, shelter, and violence concerns in East Timor must also include an aspect of nation-building. Long-term development must be considered in post-conflict reconstruction.

¹⁶<http://www.interaction.org/about-interaction>, accessed on December 10, 2010.

An increasing number of UN Missions are operating in a Chapter Seven mission capacity (Peace Enforcement), rather than in Chapter Six (Peacekeeping).¹⁷ As a result, more and more NGOs are operating in an environment where security has not been fully established, or where it has only recently been established and remains fragile. Now, more than ever, NGOs are required to operate within the same geographical area as the military. Some examples of military forces engaged in reconstruction efforts at the same time as NGOs are ISAF forces in Afghanistan, UN peacekeeping forces in East Timor, and the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.

NGOs have always relied on their adherence to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and humanity to create a “humanitarian space” within the conflict and post-conflict environment. A humanitarian space is an environment where, because of their aid efforts being made available to all persons regardless of affiliation with the conflict, NGOs consider that they are accepted by all parties and are not in a threatening environment.¹⁸

This situation is not as clear as it was in previous conflicts and the idea that aggressors respect humanitarian space is no longer clear. This shift has had multiple causes. First, there are documented cases where military personnel have been disguised as aid workers, as was the case in a 2008 Colombian military rescue operation.¹⁹ As a result, insurgents do not always consider aid workers to be impartial. Second, it has become an accepted tactic of radical insurgent groups to target aid workers in order to receive media interest and discourage the population from receiving aid. For example, in March 2010, six aid workers were killed and another seven wounded were in Pakistan, and four aid workers were also murdered in Pakistan in February 2008.²⁰ Human Rights Watch has petitioned foreign ministers from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali,

¹⁷<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/currentops.shtml>, accessed on December 10, 2010.

¹⁸Frandsen, *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military*, 166–171.

¹⁹Alexander Cuadros, “Colombia’s FARC Rebels Free First Hostage in a Year (Update 1),” *Bloomberg Businessweek* (Mar. 28, 2010) <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-03-28/colombia-s-farc-rebels-free-first-hostage-in-a-year-update1-.html>, accessed on December 10, 2010.

²⁰Christianity Today, “Islamic Gunmen Kill Christian Aid Workers in Pakistan,” *Compass Direct News* Vol. 54, (Mar. 11, 2010) <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2010/marchweb-only/20-42.0.html> accessed on December 10, 2010.

Mauritania, and Niger to provide protection to NGO personnel in response to the June 2009 killing of an American aid worker in Mauritania, the November 2009 kidnapping of three Spanish aid workers in the same country, and the November 2009 kidnapping of a French aid worker in Niger.²¹

As respect for humanitarian space has lessened, different NGOs have responded in a number of ways. Some organizations, such as Doctors Without Borders, remain adamant about not receiving any military assistance, or even giving the appearance of military assistance, as it still puts its faith in its neutrality, impartiality, and humanity. Other organizations, such as Project HOPE, have had a long-standing relationship with the military in order to take advantage of military assets; these assets can provide security, personnel transportation, logistic support, and even coordination with the host nations that allow military exercises where Project HOPE can provide health services to local nationals. An example of the impact that Project HOPE has was detailed in a June 2010 USPACOM press release.²² The release discusses the Pacific Partnership Program, which consists of a contingent of U.S. Navy ships that visits developing nations in the Pacific with a variety of government agencies and NGOs, in order to provide assistance in the form of school construction, delivery of medical care, and other community development projects. The press release also details how the integration of a 25-person medical team from Project HOPE allows the NGO to accomplish much more through this program than it would otherwise be able to; working with the military reduces travel complications, improves host nation coordination, and provides logistics assistance. Finally, this article points out that by integrating with NGOs, the military mission is capable of providing aid, such as advanced healthcare—it would not be able to do this without the cooperation of NGOs.

Most reporting on these exercises is found in public relations reports and generally provides highlights of accomplishments, including “feel-good” photographs.

²¹Corinne Dufka, “African Al Qaeda Should Stop Targeting Civilians,” *Human Rights Watch* (March 16, 2010) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/16/african-al-qaeda-should-stop-targeting-civilians>, accessed on December 10, 2010.

²²http://www.cpf.navy.mil/media/news/articles/2010/june/jun9_PP10_PACOM_Commander_Visit.shtm, accessed on December 10, 2010.

While these reports provide initial feedback, later documents have shown that the long-term effects of these exercises are not as positive as initially believed. For example, Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAP) and Dental Civil Action Programs (DENCAP) provide aid that is not available to the local population, which provided by a single delivery method might undermine the legitimacy of the local government.

The principles and ethics of NGOs have long provided them with sanctuary from harm. However, as the global environment changes, this tenet must be re-evaluated and military integration must be considered. The following sections will explore this option in greater depth.

E. MILITARY–NGO COOPERATION

The largest challenge to military–NGO integration is accounting for their different perspectives. The military and NGOs have often disagreed on either the goal of involvement or, especially, the way to achieve success. There has always been some level of coordination between the military and NGOs, but in the past it has been possible to establish divisions either in geographic scope or labor. However, with the increased involvement of the military in intrastate wars and disaster relief, these divisions of geography and labor no longer exist. It has become more common that these organizations are forced to work together in the same operating area and come to an agreement on the tactics that are employed.

1. Differences in Mindset

There are many differences between the military mindset and the NGO mindset. These stereotypes were captured during a 2008 forum hosted by the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School (CSRS). NGOs were categorized as “Naïve Do-Gooders, Tree Huggers, Disorganized Cat Herders, and Anti-Military Peaceniks,” while the military was categorized as “Baby-Killing Warmongers, Short Timers who get in and get out, and Secretive.”²³ While the exercise

²³Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, *Working in the Same Space Conference*, September 21–24, 2008.

was intended to draw out polarizing comments, it also shows the underlying differences in opinions that exist. In short, NGOs understand that the military is trying to assist the best way they are able to, but feel that they “always have an out” in terms of perspective damage to the potential of long-term relationships and development in the host nations. The military’s view of NGOs includes an understanding that they are there to solve one problem at a time, while the host nation is faced with multiple issues. There is a belief that without a coordinated effort, solving a single aspect of a crisis is fruitless. The military also commonly interprets NGO actions as being slow and ineffective in the short term, which is when results are needed most (in the military’s opinion).

2. Similarities in Mindset

Despite all of these differences, it is beginning to be accepted that over time the military mindset has been shifting away from a “short-term shock and awe” approach toward a “long-term sustainable development” approach. The CORDS program, which was implemented but not completely leveraged during the Vietnam War, and an ongoing U.S. military and economic presence maintained in South Korea serve as examples of the military’s mindset opening to the concept of long-term involvement. However, it is the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that demonstrate a complete acceptance of recent publications and instructions, which have been created with an eye toward shaping the efforts and funds spent, in order to result in a stable environment.

As military involvement has shifted from nuclear war prevention and proxy wars during the Cold War, to lower intensity conflicts, the role of insurgents, revolutionaries, and terrorists has become more prominent. In response, the U.S. military has adopted a greater counter-insurgency approach that ever before.²⁴ The fundamental theory is that by empowering the developing host nation and assisting in establishing stable governments, radical factions will not be given safe harbor. These developing nations will then be able to maintain their own national security, as well as to enhance the security of the United

²⁴U.S. DoD, *Quadriennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC, February 2010), 2.

States. This approach focuses on long-term, sustainable development where host nations develop the capacity to secure their borders and maintain peaceful stability within those borders.²⁵

The DoD recently released Instruction 3000.05, which states that the U.S. military “shall be prepared to conduct (stability operations) with proficiency equal to combat operations.”²⁶ This shift also recognizes that the military cannot conduct long-term development without the involvement of NGOs and other state agencies. The clearest example of an attempt to integrate with other entities is the employment of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams are made up of military security and members from both the DoD and DoS, with leadership from one or the other. These teams are tasked with one-year rotations in the combat zone, where they represent the coalition and provide advice and support in the areas of governance, security, agriculture, business development, etc. These teams are also charged with incorporating NGO activities into a cohesive plan for delivering not just aid, but also services that build host nation capacity.²⁷ Within a PRT, there are many advisors and coordinators (rule of law, diplomacy, agriculture, engineering, governance, and civil affairs), with each of these advisors and coordinators responsible for everything that occurs within the province.²⁸ This forces NGOs (in theory, and the majority of the time in actuality) to coordinate with the military in order to provide awareness of movement, security, and a cohesive and comprehensive development strategy. An example of this would be an NGO that has subject matter expertise in agriculture; it would have to integrate with the agriculture advisor, which would allow coordination between military and non-military actors so as to make sure that military actions were not detrimental to future development and long-lasting relationships between the NGO and the local population.

²⁵U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*, (December 2006) and US Army, *Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations* (October 2008).

²⁶U.S. DoD Instruction 3000.05. (Washington, DC, September 16, 2009).

²⁷U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations*, (October 2008).

²⁸Aaron Park, “*US Navy Seabees as a Stability Asset*” (M.A.Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2009), 27–29.

3. Benefits of Cooperation

Some NGOs, such as Doctors Without Borders and the Red Cross, argue that integration with the military is not advantageous to their mission, as they feel it detracts from their ability to allow the local populace to relate to them. They also believe that the military's non-neutrality will prevent them from delivering aid and humanitarian support. Despite these arguments, the benefits of integration are undeniable. Both NGOs and the military have unique capabilities and neither can assist the host nation alone better than they can together.

Despite high levels of competence and financing, NGOs cannot bring to their humanitarian efforts resources such as aircraft carriers, heavy airlift capabilities, medical ships, and other high value assets that the military possesses. They cannot provide for security in the same manner that the military can. The military brings these tools to the relief effort and can also augment the NGO with personnel if required (this is most common in disaster relief missions, rather than development missions) in order to more effectively deliver aid and services.

Similarly, the military, with all of its high value assets and large budget appropriation, cannot effectively distribute aid (material and services) without the assistance of NGOs. NGOs can provide local interpreters, knowledge of the geopolitical situation, and an understanding of the damage resulting from a disaster; they can also establish networks to distribute aid. The NGOs bring subject matter expertise to the situation that the military does not possess. The military is composed of individuals that specialize in warfare and do not have an extensive amount of experience in the delivery of humanitarian aid.

4. Existing Criticism of Military–NGO Cooperation

a. Criticism Against Increased Military and NGO Cooperation

There is limited academic and operational literature that discourages military–NGO cooperation. By and large, both fields have taken the position that,

through coordination, more can be accomplished. There are still those who support the traditional argument of required separation; however, these arguments are supported only by some NGOs and news organizations. These NGOs (for example, Doctors Without Borders and the International Council of the Red Cross) argue that establishing a separate humanitarian space is the only way that their survival in the combat zone can be guaranteed. They take the position that mere affiliation with the military threatens their claim to represent neutrality, impartiality, and humanity.²⁹ There has been a rise in violence towards humanitarian workers, and some news organizations have attributed this to the increased cooperation between the more cooperative NGOs and the military.³⁰

Another argument that is commonly cited in support of the separation of military and NGO action is the belief that the mindsets of these two organizations are too different to produce worthwhile conversations. Referring back to the above description of these differing mindsets, the fundamental beliefs of some NGOs (i.e., not accepting justification of force, and the use of coercion), cause military–NGO conversations to devote so much time and effort on resolving these fundamental differences that common ground can never be met.³¹

The final argument against military–NGO cooperation is the military’s need to maintain secrecy and information classification.³² According to this viewpoint, the military’s mission means that its involvement in kinetic warfare will continue. It will be tasked with operations that do not support NGO objectives (high-value personnel kidnappings, assassinations, crowd control through force) and because of this, information on current tasking and intent cannot always be shared. This perspective argues that full and open communication will never be a complete reality, and therefore trust cannot be long lasting. Unfortunately, without a high level of trust, there is no future in increased coordination.

²⁹Daniel Byman, “Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military,” *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 2, (Summer 2001), 104.

³⁰Christianity Today. and Dufka.

³¹Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crisis,” *The International Journal Of Peace Studies*, Vol. 7, No 2, (Autumn–Winter 2002), section 9.

³²Byman, “Uncertain Partners,” 105.

b. Criticism for Increased Military and NGO Cooperation

The arguments cited in the previous section are overshadowed by calls for increased coordination in both the academic and operational fields. The benefits of integration are undeniable. Both NGOs and the military have unique capabilities and neither one can assist the host nation alone better than they can together.

A 2000 RAND Report was conducted with the goal of investigating the state of military–NGO cooperation and making recommendations for improvements. The report lists the advantages of integration as more rapid responses, smoother airlifts, more timely identification of needs, better exploitation of expertise, and more efficient use of resources.³³ To explain further, despite the high level of competence and financing, NGOs cannot bring to the humanitarian efforts things like aircraft carriers, heavy airlift capabilities, medical ships, and other high value assets that the military possesses. They cannot provide for security in the same manner that the military can. The military brings these tools to the effort and augments the NGO with personnel if required (most common in disaster relief vice development missions) in order to more effectively deliver aid and services.

Similarly, the military, with all of its high value assets and large budget appropriation, cannot effectively distribute aid (material and services) without the assistance of NGOs. NGOs can provide local interpreters, knowledge of the political situation, an understanding of the damage resulting from a disaster, and a network to distribute aid. The NGOs bring subject matter expertise to the situation that the military does not possess. The military is composed of individuals that specialize in warfare and do not have an extensive amount of experience in delivery of humanitarian aid.

Kenneth Ballen presents the argument that the U.S. military's being involved in humanitarian missions has far-reaching side effects. He claims that the U.S. military is modifying its global image and that this shift reduces the military's current

³³RAND Corporation, *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2000), 73–79.

reputation of being threatening or occupational-focused. He further argues that this in turn has the effect of delegitimizing anti-U.S. terrorist organizations and increasing national security through threat reduction.³⁴

5. Summary of the Current State of Military–NGO Cooperation

The military and NGOs have had a long-standing difference of opinion regarding roles and responsibilities, as well as tactics and techniques for assisting a host nation in returning to a stable environment. During recent conflicts, the military mindset has approached a recognition that combat power is not the key to national security (as seen in DoDINST 3000.05 and the Army Field Manuals), but rather that the development of lesser developed countries in order to provide them the capacity to control possible asymmetric threats is. Only through combining the efforts of NGOs and the military can each's assets be maximized and the local population be properly served.

F. EXISTING EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION

With recognition of the importance of military–NGO relations, the military has begun spending time and efforts on training military officers for reconstruction operations in post-conflict environments. The following subsections discuss existing efforts.

1. Workshops and Conferences

One method of attempting to increase military officer competence is by providing workshops and conferences that discuss the various topics in a formal setting and that include both military and NGO participants. Some of these conferences focus on the topic of military–NGO cooperation, while others might have lectures and small group discussions that focus on a different topic, facilitating improved communication between the two communities in order to promote understanding and increased future cooperation.

³⁴Kenneth Ballen, "Humanitarian aid: winning the terror war; Peaceful military missions are curbing anti-U.S. feelings in the Muslim world," *The Christian Science Monitor*, (December 20, 2006), 9.

One example of education that is already taking place is the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course, hosted by USAID. This is a two-day forum that exposes military officers to not only the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), but also their perspective on different NGOs.³⁵

The Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) hosts four-day workshops that gather military members, NGO personnel, and other governmental employees to attend lectures and work together to focus on topics such as agricultural, security sector reform, and military–NGO relations.³⁶

2. Exercises

There are many cooperative partnership exercises that the military hosts that allow for NGO integration in non-conflict environments. These exercises include, but are not limited to, African Partnership, Pacific Partnership, and UNITAS. While some NGOs have already been incorporated, opportunities remain for increasing the level of involvement and interaction. These exercises typically consist of a Navy ship visiting underdeveloped countries and participating in humanitarian efforts.

As stated in Section D., most reporting on these exercises is found in public relations reports and generally provides highlights of accomplishments to include “feel-good” photographs. While this delivers initial feedback, some reports have stated that long-term effects of these exercises are not as beneficial as initially suspected. For example, Medical Civil Action Programs (MEDCAP) and Dental Civil Action Programs (DENCAP) provide aid that is not typically available to the local population which given in a single delivery method might undermine the legitimacy of the local government.

While this argument exists, the purpose of this thesis is to explore the effectiveness of activities that increase military–NGO cooperation, not debate the difference in short term aid and long term development.

³⁵Joint Humanitarian Operations Course hosted by USAID OFDA, (Monterey, CA, September 21–22, 2010).

³⁶“Working in the Same Space” Conference, hosted by Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies, Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA, September 21–24, 2008).

3. Briefings and Publications

Many organizations are now producing publications for military officers that either provide as much information as possible or pamphlets that contain easy-to-read summaries of military–NGO relations. In addition to these publications, most officers entering into a post-conflict environment receive command or individual situation briefings that present them with information regarding which type of NGOs are operating in the area they are reporting to, and the scope of the NGOs’ operations. These briefings and publications always try to provide balanced information, where it is not so much as to become cumbersome, but detailed enough that the information has sufficient facts to serve as more than just summaries. This balance is difficult to achieve and in some cases, publications remain unread because of either an overwhelming amount of information or information that is too telegraphic to be useful.

One example of published material that strikes the balance effectively is the *Guide to Nongovernment Organizations for the Military* by Frandsen and Lawry. It provides a good introductory conversational summary of the standard practices, capabilities, and mentalities of NGOs, in addition to providing a more detailed information appendix that can be used as reference material if required.³⁷

4. Education

The military currently has educational programs that allow officers to attend public and private universities to receive advanced degrees. Some of these programs focus on technical education such as the science and engineering fields, while other programs focus on degrees in the social sciences. The military has been traditionally more focused on technical degrees; however, with the recent increase in post-conflict reconstruction operations, it has been recognized that advanced degrees in the social sciences may be more applicable in those environments than technical ones.

³⁷Frandsen, *Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military*.

G. POTENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Sabbatical Program/Internships

The military has recently started offering a sabbatical program where members can go into a leave-without-pay status in order to pursue personal goals for up to three years.³⁸ This program, or something similar, could be leveraged or created in order to have officers spend time embedded within NGOs in order to gain understanding of the NGO perspective and the humanitarian aid, post-conflict, development environment, thus being able to better apply military assets in that environment.

The existing sabbatical program offers only health benefits while in the leave-without-pay status. This would require an NGO to hire or stipend the military member while on sabbatical. This might be unappealing to NGOs, but the creation of an internship program by the military could feasibly pay the member's salary and allow the member to work with the NGO at no cost to the NGO itself. Revisiting the issues of neutrality, impartiality, and humanity, it is understood that some NGOs would feel that having a member on the military payroll would endanger their "humanitarian space." However, looking at this possibility optimistically, it should be attempted, as the benefits of having a military member who has completed the internship program with the corresponding experiences, knowledge, and personal relationships, would increase the effectiveness of the military in that environment and the overall effectiveness of the aid and development community.

2. Military Officer Designation

Another challenge that the military faces is the current method of promoting and developing its officers. Officers are assigned to a specific warfare community (surface ships, submarines, aviation, etc.) and there is no community that focuses exclusively on military-NGO coordination. This results in officers not receiving additional training or development in this area. Most officers that become involved in the post-conflict

³⁸Rick Maze, "DoD plan would allow sabbaticals up to 3 years." *Navy Times* (April 2, 2008).

environment are only engaged in it for one tour before they are forced to rotate into another tour. Military officers have traditionally been discouraged from remaining outside of their community for too long, because this results in a decrease in name recognition and expertise in that community. This in turn typically results in reduced chances of promotion.

This pattern is seen at both the operational level and the strategic level. Most humanitarian mission involvement at the strategic level does not occur until officers are at the staff officer level (typically, O5-O6). Furthermore, the majority of the staff officers that are involved in these missions come from a warfare community. Navy Surface Warfare and Aviators or Army Infantry and Artillery Officers are frequently thrown into reconstruction operations, despite the fact that they have previously received little training in reconstruction operations; they are then expected to operate at a high level of decision-making.

Situations of this sort could be remedied by introducing junior officers into the aid and development environment and by establishing a designator or pipeline for continued development that will allow them to hone their skills, develop NGO relationships, and become experts in conflict and post-conflict development in order to create a group of senior officers that have a background in reconstruction operations.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH

The focus of this thesis is on efforts to develop military officers and the previous sections have stayed within that scope. This section, however, discusses recommendations that have been made for improving military–NGO relations, but which do not fall into the realm of officer development. This information is presented in order to provide background information on the other published recommendations and other research efforts.

1. Published Recommendations

Thomas Sexton presents an analysis of benefits of a DoD-run coordination cell, a DoS/USAID lead cell, and a hybrid coordination cell in order to increase efficiency in

humanitarian aid operations. In his conclusion, he claims that none of those options would be as beneficial as simply letting NGOs run the reconstruction efforts.³⁹ There are articles that support Sexton's claim that the military merely gets in the way and that because it is a large organization that has so many rules and regulations, and such a large tooth-to-tail ratio, it should merely play a supporting role and not try to take the lead in any humanitarian action.⁴⁰

While Sexton argues for a "military backseat role" in reconstruction, John M. George offers recommendations on how to integrate these efforts. He proposes that civilian control should be first strengthened, and that civilians should then become more educated about military assets. He recommends increasing the prestige associated with working in humanitarian efforts rather than combat operations; this can be done through promotion opportunities and exercise funding.⁴¹

Daniel Byman proposes having the military establish crisis response centers at the Combatant Command (COCOM) level in order to effectively manage resources. He also recommends strengthening the non-military departments within the government and encouraging them to lead in efforts at coordination with NGOs.⁴²

Scott Feil draws the conclusion that five areas need improvement: unity of effort; integrated security forces; DDR (demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration); regional security and reconstruction of security institutions; and information and intelligence.⁴³ Most applicable to this research project is the unity of security area, where he specifically recommends increasing the COCOM staff to include liaisons with other departments and non-state actors, increasing assessment capability by creating teams that can properly estimate the on-the-ground situation, reviewing DoD and DoS office

³⁹Thomas Sexton, *DoD Take a Knee. Let the NGOs Continue to Lead* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 2008), 9–25.

⁴⁰R.G. Edmonson, "Learning from Disaster," *Journal of Commerce*, (February 15, 2010).

⁴¹John M. George, "The Politics of Peace: The Challenge of Civil-Military Cooperation in Somalia," in *Public Administration and Management*, Vol. 10, No. 2, (2005), 180–182.

⁴²Byman, "Uncertain Partners," 109.

⁴³Scott Feil, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Post-conflict Reconstruction," *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2002), 102.

structure, realigning to improve coordination through alignment, and increasing and improving military training for the post-conflict environment.⁴⁴

Nancy Roberts brings a public administrator perspective to the conversation by recommending that research be conducted on the information processes, as categorized by the type of environment that the military and NGOs are operating in.⁴⁵ While this research would focus on the post-conflict reconstruction environment, she makes the point that what works in one type of experience or exercise (e.g., disaster relief, peacekeeping) might not work in the post-conflict environment, as the organizations have different approaches to each environment and information will be shared differently. In addition, she recommends research that differentiates between small-scale and large-scale NGOs when interacting with the military and operating independently.

2. Other Research Efforts

The military is emphasizing the design of software that is similar to social media, in that it allows information to be geo-located and shared. This allows cooperation and coordination to take place in delivering aid and assistance. Currently, the best-known software program of this type is the one developed by Usahidi. Usahidi is an NGO that provides an information-sharing forum that is commonly accessed by other NGOs in crisis and post-conflict areas.⁴⁶ The military has recognized its popularity and has decided to try to advance this technology in order to develop a resource allocation medium and thereby foster greater coordination. Two programs that are currently under development are Star Tides⁴⁷ and Quicknets.⁴⁸ While these programs show the ability to increase cooperation, they are outside of the scope of this research project.

⁴⁴Ibid., 102–103.

⁴⁵Nancy C. Roberts, “Spanning ‘Bleeding’ Boundaries: Humanitarianism, NGOs, and the Civilian-Military Nexus in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Public Administration Review* (March/April 2010), 220.

⁴⁶<http://www.usahidi.com/>, accessed on August 12, 2011.

⁴⁷<http://star-tides.net/>, accessed on August 12, 2011.

⁴⁸<http://www.quick-nets.org/>, accessed on August 12, 2011.

III. DEVELOPMENT AND RELEASE OF THE SURVEY

This chapter will discuss the effort that was put into developing and releasing the survey, in order to provide insight into the survey-creation process and the information that each question was designed to solicit from the respondent.

A. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT SOFTWARE

In accordance with Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) Human Research Protection Program Policy on the Use of Online Survey Data Collection Tools⁴⁹ and the direction of the NPS Institutional Review Board for Protection of Human Subject's (IRB) guidance, the online tool Survey Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com) was used. Survey Monkey is online software that allows surveys to be developed and that creates a unique hyperlink that can be e-mailed to potential respondents inviting them to participate.

B. GOALS FOR THE SURVEY

The goal of the survey is to gauge the effectiveness of ongoing efforts and to explore the feasibility of potential improvements. This survey was designed to be presented to people with practical, relevant experience in order to anonymously extract opinions and perceptions, which would determine a baseline of what is working and would also identify possible opportunities for introducing better methods. The results of this survey are to become available to the academic field for future research and to military decision makers who can utilize this information to make decisions as to what sort of training and preparation should be available for military officers.

C. ESTABLISHING A POOL OF PARTICIPANTS

Invitation e-mails were sent to two groups of individuals. The first included individuals participating in NPS RELIEF (Research & Experimentation for Local & International Emergency & First Responders) and the second, members of the Center for

⁴⁹Naval Postgraduate School Memorandum Ser. 41/126, January 31, 2011

Excellence in Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance Headquarters Office (COE) located in Honolulu, Hawaii. Both of these organizations were approached prior to their participants and members being invited to take the survey, in order to gain permission from a supervisory member to allow personnel under their responsibility to participate in this research.

These organizations sometimes focus on the humanitarian relief aspect of military–NGO operations; however, the members of these organizations are also familiar with the post-conflict environment and the interaction of the two mentalities, which is applicable to this study.

1. Naval Postgraduate School RELIEF Participants

The Naval Postgraduate School hosts numerous conferences and workshops that address a wide spectrum of issues related to the military.

RELIEF seeks to leverage technology to explore solutions to challenges created by natural and/or man-made disasters. We bring together corporations, non-profits, local, state, federal, and international government agencies in a field environment to get dirty, forge relationships, and find solutions together.⁵⁰

The RELIEF 11-4 conference took place at Camp Roberts, California, from August 3, 2011 to August 5, 2011, with 98 participants.

2. Center for Excellence in Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance

The COE is a DoD organization dedicated to international disaster preparedness and management capacity building for the purpose of decreasing the impact of human suffering. Established by Congress in 1994 as a direct reporting unit to the PACOM, the COE now supports U.S. COCOMs throughout the world.⁵¹

⁵⁰<http://faculty.nps.edu/rrbuettl/index.html>, accessed on July 28, 2011.

⁵¹<http://coe-dmha.org/AboutUs/Default.aspx>, accessed on July 28, 2011.

Through a personal contact, the COE was approached to participate in the survey in order to provide a military perspective of experience in the results of the survey. Seven people from this organization were invited to participate in the survey.

3. Sample Size Analysis

The entire military–NGO field is comprised of thousands of people from both the military and NGOs. Due to restrictions on human research, the unavailability of a coherent network or contact list, and the complications of trying to compile and analyze that amount of data, the scope of this thesis was narrowed to obtain a sampling of the field. This sampling cannot be considered inclusive enough to capture all of the opinions and perspectives of the entire field. This pool of participants was selected because, while it doesn't include all of the personnel involved in the field, it can provide an accurate sampling that should be large enough to draw some basic conclusions on the themes of the survey participants' opinions and perspectives.

4. Institutional Review Board Authority

All appropriate paperwork was submitted to the NPS IRB prior to inviting any human subject to participate in the research effort. The research project was granted permission to proceed on June 22, 2011 (initial application to release survey to COE) and July 8, 2011 (amendment to broaden survey to include RELIEF personnel). Approval was based on the research being anonymous and voluntary, that it did not propose collection of personal identifying information, and the determination that this research is considered minimal risk.

D. CONSENT STATEMENT

In accordance with IRB protocol, a voluntary consent form was presented as the first question and was a mandatory question (as annotated by asterisk preceding the question number). Through the Survey Monkey software, participants were incapable of proceeding to the following questions without an affirmative response to the consent statement.

* 1. You are invited to participate in a research study entitled "Improving Military-NGO Relations." This research will assist in assessing current practices and identify other possible methods of developing better coordination and cooperation in the future.

This survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any questions or stop participating at anytime without penalty. Your responses are anonymous. Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to unauthorized persons; however, there is a minor risk that data collected could be mismanaged.

If you have questions regarding the research, contact LCDR David Matvay at dmmatvay@nps.edu or Dr. Sophal Ear at sear@nps.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval Postgraduate School IRB Chair, CAPT John Schmidt, jkschmid@nps.edu, 831-656-3864.

Each question will have a brief statement followed by a rating scale of how true you feel that statement is. After each rating opportunity, there is a comment block where you are invited to provide additional insight that you feel is not captured in the statement.

By continuing with this survey I am signifying my consent.

☐ Yes

Next

Figure 1. Consent Statement Screenshot

E. MULTIPLE CHOICE SURVEY QUESTIONS

The survey consisted of eight multiple-choice topical questions where participants were required to reply on a Likert Scale that normalized responses in the standard categories of "Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neutral, Agree, and Strongly Agree." Questions also contained an "N/A" or Not Applicable choice. This was done in order to be able to categorize responses and sort the data into the charts that are presented in Chapter IV.

Each question also had an open comment block where participants could provide additional input, such as expanding their response to include an explanation of their answer, expound on their perspective, or provide feedback on the question in terms of how it was framed and asked.

The survey was limited to eight main questions in order to remain brief. This was done with intent of promoting participation and preventing those participants that started the survey from not finishing due to the time commitment.

1. Question 1

1. During post-conflict operations there are a variety of actors. Military and the NGO community provide the majority of the personnel acting in these environments. There are arguments for and against increasing the role of the military in these environments. Arguments for increasing the military role consist of: the military can provide better transportation, communication equipment, protection of humanitarian supplies, and additional aid personnel. Arguments against increasing the military role consist of: the military and NGO cultures are too polarizing to produce effective coordination, the agendas and purpose of the military and NGOs differences prevent coordination, and cooperation blurs the lines of humanitarian space.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A
The military involvement in post-conflict operations is essential to the success of the operation and the military should increase its involvement in this type of operation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Comments:	<input type="text"/>					

Figure 2. Question 1 Screenshot

This question was developed to gauge the participants' opinion of the military's role in post-conflict coordination. It was written to discover if the respondents felt there were positive or negative impacts. According to academic literature, the involvement of the military is essential to establish security and has the added benefit of improving the delivery of supplies and personnel into hostile regions. This question was intended to confirm if the academic view is shared amongst field operatives and to provide validation that the first part of the hypothesis is widely accepted by the participants of the survey.

2. Question 2

2. Various offices within the Department of Defense have developed workshops, exercises, pamphlets, and publications in order to increase the military officer's knowledge of NGOs to facilitate better communication and interaction.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A
Overall, the level of preparation that military officers receive is adequate for the type of operations they are involved in.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Comments:	<input type="text"/>					

Figure 3. Question 2 Screenshot

This question was designed to extract the opinion towards military officers that are engaged in post-conflict operations. There are many ongoing preparation matters; however, the quality and delivery of that material is sometimes questionable. This question generated feedback on the end product: the military officer's capabilities. It was also intended to validate the third portion of the hypothesis, namely, that military officers should be better prepared for the post-conflict environment.

3. Question 3

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
3. Many organizations host collaborative workshops that focus on the interaction between military and NGO participants. These workshops consist of lecture style briefings and small group activities that aim to increase understanding of both of the cultures.					
These workshops are effective at meeting their goals.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
If the workshop was longer in length it would have been more effective.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Comments:	<input type="text"/>				

Figure 4. Question 3 Screenshot

Questions 3 through 8 are a series of questions that were designed to collect data that would narrow the focus of Question 2 by querying the respondent on each of the elements within Question 2.

Question 3 investigates the effectiveness of workshops and seminars. This question was broken in two multiple-choice sub-questions in order to accurately grasp the effectiveness of collaborative workshops. The first sub-question was meant to solicit feedback on the quality of the workshops. The second sub-question was developed to see if there is a declining return on investment in terms of time; in other words, as the conference continues in length do participants and organizations continue to get similar benefits for expending their time and funds as they did at the beginning of the workshop. Typical workshops do not last longer than one work week: the JHOC is a two-day seminar, RELIEF 11-4 is a three-day workshop, and the CSRS seminars are four days in length. Through personal observation, the workshops operate in a similar manner to a

traditional learning curve, where the incremental change in knowledge is larger during the introduction of material, but tapers off as the workshop continues.

The responses to this question were carefully reviewed, as the RELIEF participant pool was preparing to take part in a workshop and the COE provides workshops and conferences. Responses could thus have been an attempt to influence the availability of funding through self-justification.

4. Question 4

4. The Department of Defense currently funds humanitarian exercises where NGO participation allows aid (medical, dental, infrastructure, and supplies) to be delivered to less developed countries. African Partnership, Cobra Gold, New Horizons, and Pacific Partnership are examples of these types of exercises.						
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A
These exercises prepare military officers for future integrated post-conflict operations and increase the potential for future coordination.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Comments: <input type="text"/>						

Figure 5. Question 4 Screenshot

The purpose of this question was to receive feedback in terms of the usefulness of the exercises that are routinely conducted.

5. Question 5

5. The military has begun providing briefings, publishing handouts, pamphlets, and publications that describe the organizational structure of NGOs, common approaches towards problem solving, and recommendations on how to interact together.						
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A
The material produced by the military is adequate in preparing military officers for operations in the post-conflict environment.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Comments: <input type="text"/>						

Figure 6. Question 5 Screenshot

This question was developed to receive feedback on the completeness, effectiveness, and availability of the materials presented to the military officers who are preparing to engage in post-conflict operations.

6. Question 6

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A
<p>6. The military funds a percentage of officers to attend graduate level courses that can focus on a variety of curricula. Some officers are offered opportunities to pursue social science degrees that may be effective in increasing an officer's preparedness for operations in a post-conflict environment.</p> <p>The military should increase the amount of funding and opportunities to send officers to receive social science degrees that would be applicable to post-conflict operations.</p>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<p>Comments:</p> <div></div>						

Figure 7. Question 6 Screenshot

This question was developed to gain an understanding of the perception of military officers of advanced degrees and to gauge the worthiness of increased spending on military officer education. As with previous questions, this question was designed provide feedback on potential return on investment of funds.

7. Question 7

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A
<p>7. Some sources suggests that regardless of education and previous military exercise experience, there is too much of a cultural difference between the two cultures that coordination will remain difficult until a method of bridging that difference is created.</p> <p>The difference in mentalities between military and NGOs is too large to ever allow effective coordination.</p>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<p>While the difference in mentalities is great, the best way to overcome it would be to allow military officers a sabbatical where they could work for an NGO to fully appreciate the NGO mentality.</p>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<p>Comments:</p> <div></div>						

Figure 8. Question 7 Screenshot

This question was developed with two sub-questions in an effort to gauge the existing perception of room for potential increases in military–NGO coordination. While academic literature supports the argument that the differences in mindset can be overcome, and must be overcome to operate more effectively, this question was intended reveal the opinions of field operatives.

This question also introduced the concept of having military officers conduct embedded training with an NGO to increase the officer’s understanding of the NGO environment, organization, and perspective. This question was also intended to provide insight into the openness of NGOs in allowing a military member to be incorporated into their workforce.

8. Question 8

8. The military officer promotion system is complicated and involves officers being categorized by their job function and compared to their peers.						
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A
Officers that become involved in post-conflict coordination operations receive a fair percentage of promotions compared to officers that remain on their traditional career path which typically excludes operations in that environment.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
There should be a separate category for officers with post-conflict operation experience in order to guarantee a fair opportunity of promotion.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
There is a shortage of senior officers with post-conflict operation experience, which is effecting the strategic decision making and establishing a distinct promotion category will allow better future decision making.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Comments:						
<div></div>						

Figure 9. Question 8 Sceenshot

Traditionally, military officers are not afforded the opportunity to focus on the area of post-conflict operations; they are encouraged to remain within their specific skill set (aviation, surface warfare, etc.) and even if an officer has the ability to take advantage

of a post-conflict operations experience, rarely is he or she allowed to remain in that arena. If the responses indicate that quality of an officer is not optimal, due to lack of proper development, then this would provide insight into possible changes in the promotion system or manpower organization.

F. OPEN COMMENT QUESTIONS

1. If you would like to be contacted in order to provide additional feedback on this survey, participate in an interview in order to provide insight to perspectives not captured in this survey, or are interested in the results of this research project please provide an email address that you can be contacted.

2. If you are aware of other individuals who have insights relevant to this survey and whose participation would benefit this research project, please provide their name(s) and contact information.

Prev Done

Figure 10. Open Comment Questions Screenshot

These final question blocks were provided in order to offer participants an opportunity to be contacted to share amplifying information and to recommend someone else to be surveyed. While each question had an individual comment box, the purpose of this field was to request to be contacted to provide additional input to the survey or to be provided the results of the survey.

It was the intent of the research team to provide a summary of results to those individuals interested in receiving information; in addition, a briefing was provided at RELIEF 11-4 on August 5, 2011 that presented the initial results. Responses to this section were omitted from the publication of this thesis in order to prevent e-mail address information from being made public.

G. RELEASE OF THE SURVEY

Upon receiving approval of the survey and approval of the participant list, an e-mail was distributed on July 13, 2011, stating that the survey was available for participation. The RELIEF 11-4 facilitators maintained the e-mail list of participants and distributed the invitation e-mail. The survey remained available for review and completion until August 16, 2011. The survey remained open for a total of 34 days, which was estimated to be the appropriate amount of time to capture people prior to participating in the RELIEF 11-4 workshop, during the workshop, and those that were recommended by the original survey participants. The timeframe of four weeks was estimated to be suitable, because if a potential participant was on vacation or travelled during a portion of this time he or she would still have the opportunity to participate.

The e-mail invitation to participate was distributed from the research team directly to the participants from COE and to RELIEF participants via the workshop facilitators.




Figure 11. Invitation E-mail Screenshot

H. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

This survey collected no demographic data in order to provide the respondents with the confidence that results would be completely anonymous. This prevented results from being analyzed through grouping respondents by career field; however, this was done in effort to receive more truthful answers, as participants would not be concerned that any answer could result in retribution.

IV. SURVEY RESULTS

A. SUMMARY OF PARTICIPATION

Of those who were invited to participate, 52 people opened the link to the survey; of that number, 27 completed the survey in its entirety. This is a 52% completion rate among those that attempted the survey. From the overall invitation listing (7 COE and 98 RELIEF, totaling 105), this resulted in 25% participation. This percentage appears appropriate, as not all people participating in the RELIEF Conference have applicable experience in the military–NGO relations field. The number of responses appears to be an adequate sampling of people with applicable experience, who can respond to the survey and provide results that can be analyzed.

B. DETAILED RESULTS BY QUESTION

In reviewing the responses and extracting information in order to make comprehensive statements, the data was filtered by first removing the “Not Applicable” responses and then by placing the responses in a pie chart. The charts display the answers separated by the Likert Scale in the first chart and then grouped by positive (“Strongly Agree” and “Agree”) and negative (“Strongly Disagree” and “Disagree”) responses for second chart. This was done in order to graphically depict the data, which assists in the interpretation of the responses. No in-depth statistical methods were used in the data analysis, as the purpose of this study was to find general impressions and perceptions.

1. Question 1

a. Response Data

<p>1. During post-conflict operations there are a variety of actors. Military and the NGO community provide the majority of the personnel acting in these environments. There are arguments for and against increasing the role of the military in these environments. Arguments for increasing the military role consist of: the military can provide better transportation, communication equipment, protection of humanitarian supplies, and additional aid personnel. Arguments against increasing the military role consist of: the military and NGO cultures are too polarizing to produce effective coordination, the agendas and purpose of the military and NGOs differences prevent coordination, and cooperation blurs the lines of humanitarian space.</p>								
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The military involvement in post-conflict operations is essential to the success of the operation and the military should increase its involvement in this type of operation	7.4% (2)	18.5% (5)	14.8% (4)	29.6% (8)	29.6% (8)	0.0% (0)	3.56	27

Figure 12. Question 1 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 13. Question 1 Charts

c. Analysis

One-third of the respondents selected “Strongly Agree” and over half answered in the affirmative that military involvement is required in post-conflict operations. Just over 25% of respondents replied in the negative. These responses show

that there is general, although not overwhelming, concurrence with the academic literature and the first part of this thesis' hypothesis.

The majority of open-ended responses proposed that the answer should not necessarily be a “yes” or “no,” but rather that it should be situation-driven based on the security situation, the terrain, the needs of the humanitarian or reconstruction effort, and culture of the population receiving the help. Most respondents did recognize that there are situations where military involvement should be provided and is necessary.

2. Question 2

a. Response Data

2. Various offices within the Department of Defense have developed workshops, exercises, pamphlets, and publications in order to increase the military officer's knowledge of NGOs to facilitate better communication and interaction.							Create Chart	Download
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
Overall, the level of preparation that military officers receive is adequate for the type of operations they are involved in.	3.6% (1)	50.0% (14)	25.0% (7)	21.4% (6)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	2.64	28

Figure 14. Question 2 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 15. Question 2 Charts

c. Analysis

The responses received confirm that there is skepticism regarding the preparedness of military officers who find themselves in military–NGO operations and that existing methods of preparing military officers for these operations are not as effective as they could be; less than 25% of respondents felt that officers were properly prepared. This confirms the third part of the hypothesis, namely, that military officers are not properly prepared for the situations they are placed in.

3. Question 3

a. Response Data

3. Many organizations host collaborative workshops that focus on the interaction between military and NGO participants. These workshops consist of lecture style briefings and small group activities that aim to increase understanding of both of the cultures.							
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
These workshops are effective at meeting their goals.	3.7% (1)	14.8% (4)	37.0% (10)	37.0% (10)	7.4% (2)	3.30	27
If the workshop was longer in length it would have been more effective.	0.0% (0)	25.9% (7)	44.4% (12)	29.6% (8)	0.0% (0)	3.04	27

Figure 16. Question 3 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 17. Question 3 Charts

c. Analysis

The responses to the first sub-question indicate that workshops are generally well received; however, the large portion of neutral responses, nearly 40%, as well as less than 50% of positive replies, indicates that there is either a level of apathy toward or a strong variance in the quality of workshops. The open-ended responses highlighted that NGOs find it difficult to participate due to time and funding constraints and as a result these workshops are predominantly attended by the military and other government organizations. The scenario described does not benefit military–NGO coordination to the level that the workshops advertise. These responses were unexpected, as the people participating in the survey either were attending a workshop or are responsible for hosting one.

The responses to the second sub-question contained no “Strongly Agree” or “Strongly Disagree”; with nearly half of the replies being neutral it appears that the timeframe of the workshops is about right.

4. Question 4

a. Response Data

4. The Department of Defense currently funds humanitarian exercises where NGO participation allows aid (medical, dental, infrastructure, and supplies) to be delivered to less developed countries. African Partnership, Cobra Gold, New Horizons, and Pacific Partnership are examples of these types of exercises.								
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
These exercises prepare military officers for future integrated post-conflict operations and increase the potential for future coordination.	3.6% (1)	0.0% (0)	21.4% (6)	35.7% (10)	39.3% (11)	0.0% (0)	4.07	28

Figure 18. Question 4 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 19. Question 4 Charts

c. Analysis

In response to Question 4, there were more “Strongly Agree” replies for this question than any other. This combined with only one “Strongly Disagree” and an

overwhelming 75% positive response indicates a high level of support for these types of exercises. Further, these responses indicate that by military and NGO personnel working together, they gain a better understanding of each other's organization and mindset, which allows development of the military officer.

5. Question 5

a. Response Data

5. The military has begun providing briefings, publishing handouts, pamphlets, and publications that describe the organizational structure of NGOs, common approaches towards problem solving, and recommendations on how to interact together. Create Chart Download								
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The material produced by the military is adequate in preparing military officers for operations in the post-conflict environment.	0.0% (0)	21.4% (6)	42.9% (12)	14.3% (4)	0.0% (0)	21.4% (6)	2.91	28

Figure 20. Question 5 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 21. Question 5 Charts

c. Analysis

The majority of the replies to this question was “Neutral” and contained no “Strongly Agree” or “Strongly Disagree” responses. This can be interpreted as a lack

of strong emotions towards written publications and a lack of support for continued development of publications compared to other methods of developing military officers. However, this question had the lowest number of positive responses than any other recommendation. An open-ended comment is quick to point out “...no pamphlet replaces experience and face-to-face interaction.” Another challenge of written publications appears to be that there is such a vast and varied collection of publications that officers are overwhelmed by trying to find what is relevant material and what is not.

6. Question 6

a. Response Data

6. The military funds a percentage of officers to attend graduate level courses that can focus on a variety of curricula. Some officers are offered opportunities to pursue social science degrees that may be effective in increasing an officer's preparedness for operations in a post-conflict environment. Create Chart Download								
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The military should increase the amount of funding and opportunities to send officers to receive social science degrees that would be applicable to post-conflict operations.	0.0% (0)	3.6% (1)	14.3% (4)	57.1% (16)	25.0% (7)	0.0% (0)	4.04	28

Figure 22. Question 6 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 23. Question 6 Charts

c. Analysis

This question received the strongest positive response compared to all other questions. In addition to having such an overwhelming positive response, this was the only question that had only one negative response. It should be deduced here that the participants value education highly and that they feel the right kind of education has the ability to shift the military officer's mindset towards cooperation, more than any of the other proposed recommendations. The open-ended responses clearly indicated that the military needs to be less technically minded and more inclined toward social science because opinion is that future conflicts will involve social problems.

7. Question 7

a. Response Data

7. Some sources suggests that regardless of education and previous military exercise experience, there is too much of a cultural difference between the two cultures that coordination will remain difficult until a method of bridging that difference is created. Create Chart Download								
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The difference in mentalities between military and NGOs is too large to ever allow effective coordination.	25.0% (7)	46.4% (13)	14.3% (4)	7.1% (2)	7.1% (2)	0.0% (0)	2.25	28
While the difference in mentalities is great, the best way to overcome it would be to allow military officers a sabbatical where they could work for an NGO to fully appreciate the NGO mentality.	3.6% (1)	21.4% (6)	28.6% (8)	35.7% (10)	10.7% (3)	0.0% (0)	3.29	28

Figure 24. Question 7 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 25. Question 7 Charts

c. Analysis

The first sub-question solicited a negative majority response of nearly 75%, which underscores that participants feel strongly that there is room for improvement in this area and that improvements can in fact be made.

The second sub-question introduced the concept of embedding an officer within an NGO when that officer was taking part in a sabbatical from his or her traditional occupation. This concept was well received, with a nearly 50% positive response and only 25% feeling this was a bad concept. Open-ended comments provide further insight through statements that embedding military offices on sabbatical could be considered overly ambitious; however, the establishment of a position for a permanent duty direct liaison, or for a well-developed subject matter expert who would be responsible for coordination with specific NGOs, could be more achievable goal.

8. Question 8

a. Response Data

8. The military officer promotion system is complicated and involves officers being categorized by their job function and compared to their peers.							Create Chart	Download
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
Officers that become involved in post-conflict coordination operations receive a fair percentage of promotions compared to officers that remain on their traditional career path which typically excludes operations in that environment.	0.0% (0)	14.3% (4)	50.0% (14)	7.1% (2)	3.6% (1)	25.0% (7)	3.00	28
There should be a separate category for officers with post-conflict operation experience in order to guarantee a fair opportunity of promotion.	3.6% (1)	14.3% (4)	35.7% (10)	25.0% (7)	3.6% (1)	17.9% (5)	3.13	28
There is a shortage of senior officers with post-conflict operation experience, which is effecting the strategic decision making and establishing a distinct promotion category will allow better future decision making.	3.6% (1)	10.7% (3)	42.9% (12)	21.4% (6)	3.6% (1)	17.9% (5)	3.13	28

Figure 26. Question 8 Results Screenshot

b. Charts




Figure 27. Question 8 Charts

c. Analysis

This question received more “Not Applicable” responses than any other question in the survey set. This is understandable, as the military promotion system is unfamiliar to those that do not have regular dealings with the system, such as non-military personnel. In addition to a high number of “Not Applicable” responses, there

was also a high percentage of “Neutral” replies. Overall, the responses to these three sub-questions were fairly balanced between positive and negative, with the participants showing minor interest in changing the promotion system compared to other recommendations.

C. OPEN COMMENT QUESTIONS

The open comment questions provided a listing of participants that were interested in receiving feedback from this survey. They were provided, via e-mail, the charts that are included in this thesis and directions on how to access the Defense Technical Information Center website in order to allow them to review this thesis upon its publication.

Two additional e-mail addresses were also provided for people who were recommended to participate in the survey. The invitation to participate e-mail was sent to both of them. Due to anonymity, it is impossible to confirm their participation.

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V. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS

In summary, the results of this survey supported the hypotheses that were previously presented: military involvement is required in the post-conflict environment; there is a notable amount of room for improvement in the area of military-NGO cooperation and coordination; and by properly preparing military officers to operate in this environment, there will be improved cooperation and coordination between the military and NGOs.

The first survey question established that the military's involvement is required in post-conflict efforts, with a 58% concurrence, and only 27% responding negatively. The remaining questions were useful in determining validation of the remaining parts of the hypothesis by indicating that if military officers received better training and better understood the NGO organization and mindset, they would be more open-minded about participating in cooperation efforts, which would then lead to better cooperation and coordination in the future.

1. Themes That Were Identified

When reviewed holistically, these responses can provide some easily recognizable themes. First, confirming the hypothesis, it is recognized that there is support for military involvement in the post-conflict environment, that there is a need for improvement in military-NGO cooperation and coordination, and that improvements can be made by better preparing military officers. Second, there is support for efforts to develop military officers focused on interaction with people outside of the military through continued education or exercises rather than through literature or briefings. Third, opportunities to cooperate and coordinate in controlled scenarios will lead to more effective cooperation and coordination in challenging real-world scenarios.

2. Recommendations Toward Improving Military–NGO Relations

The final seven multiple choice questions contained opportunities for the participants to comment on existing military officer training efforts and potential recommendations for the future. This was done to provide information regarding the expected effectiveness of methods so as to allow continued focus on those methods that are effective, to discontinue or improve methods not considered as effective, or implement new methods that received support. The respondents provided data that indicates the preferred way of improving military officer preparedness is by providing advanced social science education, followed closely by participation in exercises where military and NGO personnel interact, as seen in the high positive response percentages for these options. The concepts of sabbaticals, workshops, and altering the promotion system received positive responses and support; however, none of these topics stood out with overwhelming support in terms of positive response percentages. Workshops, conferences, and the sabbatical concept scored higher than promotion system adjustments due to fewer negative responses. The provision of briefings, publications, and pamphlets received the lowest amount of support with less than 20% of the participants stating that this method has been effective.

Question	Element	Positive Response %	Rating Average
6	Social Science Degree	82%	4.04
4	Cooperative Exercises	75%	4.07
7.2	Embedded with NGO on Sabbatical	46%	3.29
3.1	Workshops and Conferences	44%	3.30
8.2	Adjust the Promotion System	35%	3.13
5	Briefings and Publications	18%	2.91

Table 1. Recommendation Analysis

B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This research provided valuable data in the field of military–NGO relations; however, the interpretation of the data, as carried out by this thesis’s examination of survey results, merely represents a starting point for future research.

The data reviewed represents the opinions and perceptions of only a fraction of the people involved in military–NGO cooperation efforts. Due to constraints on time, human research protocols, and the lack of an existing network this survey was only available to a limited number of the relevant population. Future research should attempt to broaden the participant base. This broadening should be in not just the number of people surveyed, but also the number and types of organizations, with an eye toward capturing all relevant perspectives. This would allow more all-encompassing data that could be reviewed for themes in order to make recommendations.

In addition to expanding the participant pool, it is also recommended that future surveys include demographic information questions. This would allow for more in-depth analyses of which organizations support certain recommendations.

This thesis focused on the development of the military officer; however, there are numerous ongoing efforts towards improving the state of the relationship between the military and NGOs. One recommendation is to realign military organizations so that they are more easily understood by NGOs, which would provide NGO personnel a method of entering the military decision-making system. There is a contingent of people that feels that information-sharing through technology will lead to greater cooperation and coordination. This group feels that resource leveling and volunteerism tasking can occur through software and remove personalities from the equation, which will allow delivery of humanitarian aid to whoever is identified from any organization, regardless of affiliation. The improvement effort should also consider how to educate and increase the NGO personnel’s understanding of the military. Future research should broaden recommendations for improving military–NGO relations by allowing respondents to provide feedback on these methods in addition to officer development recommendations.

Future research should implement more advanced statistical data processing to better analyze the results in order to provide better insight into the respondents' answers. This will allow for identification and removal of potential spoilers to the survey, as well as providing a better understanding of the strength of the respondents' answers.

While not necessary for future survey deployment, survey release can be conducted during a specific conference. This would allow a streamlined IRB package, as the organization responsible for hosting the conference has the authority to give all participants permission to be involved. In addition, having the participants, computers, and response time built into the conference schedule, it can be assumed that the survey completion percentage would increase, as the target audience would not be distracted during the release of a survey, as is often the case when people are not collocated.

C. CLOSING STATEMENT

In closing, the research conducted in this thesis confirms the hypothesis that was originally stated: the military's involvement is required in the reconstruction effort in the post-conflict environment due to security concerns, funding and resource availability, and involvement leading to the transition from a conflict to post-conflict situation; there are inefficiencies in military-NGO cooperation and coordination due to differences in mindsets or a general lack of understanding, and that this area has room for improvement that will allow better cooperation and coordination in the future; and that by better preparing military officers assigned to post-conflict reconstruction through education, exercises, and other opportunities for interaction, cooperation and coordination can be improved.

This thesis provides the academic field with a baseline of data that can be carried forward through other research. In addition, it provides military decision-makers information that can be used to better prepare military officers for post-conflict reconstruction operations.

APPENDIX. SURVEY RESULTS SCREENSHOTS

A. DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY RESULTS SCREENSHOTS


The following 15 pages contain screen shots of the of the survey results as provided by www.surveymonkey.com. This information was then reviewed and the data inserted into graphs to provide clarity when reviewing. These graphs can be found in Chapter IV. Also included in this appendix are the comments provided by the respondents. Comments of note or if there was a significant theme found in the responses, this observation was stated in Chapter IV. The comments are listed in their entirety in order to provide a comprehensive report for future researchers. The second half of Page 15 and all of Page 16 have been removed in order to protect e-mail addresses of individuals that requested to receive feedback on this research.

This thesis organized the multiple choice questions as one through eight because that is how it appeared to those taking the survey; however, the screenshots of the survey result include the consent statement as Question 1 and each following question to be considered one more than portrayed in the thesis chapters.

Military-NGO Coordination Survey



1. You are invited to participate in a research study entitled “Improving Military-NGO Relations.” This research will assist in assessing current practices and identify other possible methods of developing better coordination and cooperation in the future. This survey should take about 15 minutes to complete. Your participation is voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any questions or stop participating at anytime without penalty. Your responses are anonymous. Results of the survey will be used responsibly and protected against release to unauthorized persons; however, there is a minor risk that data collected could be mismanaged. If you have questions regarding the research, contact LCDR David Matvay at dmmatvay@nps.edu or Dr. Sophal Ear at sear@nps.edu. If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research subject, please contact the Naval Postgraduate School IRB Chair, CAPT John Schmidt, jkschmid@nps.edu, 831-656-3864. Each question will have a brief statement followed by a rating scale of how true you feel that statement is. After each rating opportunity, there is a comment block where you are invited to provide additional insight that you feel is not captured in the statement. By continuing with this survey I am signifying my consent.

	Response Percent	Response Count
Yes 	100.0%	53
answered question		53
skipped question		0

2. During post-conflict operations there are a variety of actors. Military and the NGO community provide the majority of the personnel acting in these environments. There are arguments for and against increasing the role of the military in these environments. Arguments for increasing the military role consist of: the military can provide better transportation, communication equipment, protection of humanitarian supplies, and additional aid personnel. Arguments against increasing the military role consist of: the military and NGO cultures are too polarizing to produce effective coordination, the agendas and purpose of the military and NGOs differences prevent coordination, and cooperation blurs the lines of humanitarian space.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The military involvement in post-conflict operations is essential to the success of the operation and the military should increase its involvement in this type of operation	7.4% (2)	18.5% (5)	14.8% (4)	29.6% (8)	29.6% (8)	0.0% (0)	3.56	27
Comments:								18
answered question								27
skipped question								26

3. Various offices within the Department of Defense have developed workshops, exercises, pamphlets, and publications in order to increase the military officer's knowledge of NGOs to facilitate better communication and interaction.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
Overall, the level of preparation that military officers receive is adequate for the type of operations they are involved in.	3.6% (1)	50.0% (14)	25.0% (7)	21.4% (6)	0.0% (0)	0.0% (0)	2.64	28
Comments:								14
answered question								28
skipped question								25

4. Many organizations host collaborative workshops that focus on the interaction between military and NGO participants. These workshops consist of lecture style briefings and small group activities that aim to increase understanding of both of the cultures.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	Rating Average	Response Count
These workshops are effective at meeting their goals.	3.7% (1)	14.8% (4)	37.0% (10)	37.0% (10)	7.4% (2)	3.30	27
If the workshop was longer in length it would have been more effective.	0.0% (0)	25.9% (7)	44.4% (12)	29.6% (8)	0.0% (0)	3.04	27
Comments:							13
answered question							27
skipped question							26

5. The Department of Defense currently funds humanitarian exercises where NGO participation allows aid (medical, dental, infrastructure, and supplies) to be delivered to less developed countries. African Partnership, Cobra Gold, New Horizons, and Pacific Partnership are examples of these types of exercises.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
These exercises prepare military officers for future integrated post-conflict operations and increase the potential for future coordination.	3.6% (1)	0.0% (0)	21.4% (6)	35.7% (10)	39.3% (11)	0.0% (0)	4.07	28
Comments:								8
answered question								28
skipped question								25

6. The military has begun providing briefings, publishing handouts, pamphlets, and publications that describe the organizational structure of NGOs, common approaches towards problem solving, and recommendations on how to interact together.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The material produced by the military is adequate in preparing military officers for operations in the post-conflict environment.	0.0% (0)	21.4% (6)	42.9% (12)	14.3% (4)	0.0% (0)	21.4% (6)	2.91	28
Comments:	15							
answered question	28							
skipped question	25							

7. The military funds a percentage of officers to attend graduate level courses that can focus on a variety of curricula. Some officers are offered opportunities to pursue social science degrees that may be effective in increasing an officer's preparedness for operations in a post-conflict environment.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The military should increase the amount of funding and opportunities to send officers to receive social science degrees that would be applicable to post-conflict operations.	0.0% (0)	3.6% (1)	14.3% (4)	57.1% (16)	25.0% (7)	0.0% (0)	4.04	28
Comments:	9							
answered question	28							
skipped question	25							

8. Some sources suggests that regardless of education and previous military exercise experience, there is too much of a cultural difference between the two cultures that coordination will remain difficult until a method of bridging that difference is created.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
The difference in mentalities between military and NGOs is too large to ever allow effective coordination.	25.0% (7)	46.4% (13)	14.3% (4)	7.1% (2)	7.1% (2)	0.0% (0)	2.25	28
While the difference in mentalities is great, the best way to overcome it would be to allow military officers a sabbatical where they could work for an NGO to fully appreciate the NGO mentality.	3.6% (1)	21.4% (6)	28.6% (8)	35.7% (10)	10.7% (3)	0.0% (0)	3.29	28
Comments:								14
answered question								28
skipped question								25

9. The military officer promotion system is complicated and involves officers being categorized by their job function and compared to their peers.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree	N/A	Rating Average	Response Count
Officers that become involved in post-conflict coordination operations receive a fair percentage of promotions compared to officers that remain on their traditional career path which typically excludes operations in that environment.	0.0% (0)	14.3% (4)	50.0% (14)	7.1% (2)	3.6% (1)	25.0% (7)	3.00	28
There should be a separate category for officers with post-conflict operation experience in order to guarantee a fair opportunity of promotion.	3.6% (1)	14.3% (4)	35.7% (10)	25.0% (7)	3.6% (1)	17.9% (5)	3.13	28
There is a shortage of senior officers with post-conflict operation experience, which is effecting the strategic decision making and establishing a distinct promotion category will allow better future decision making.	3.6% (1)	10.7% (3)	42.9% (12)	21.4% (6)	3.6% (1)	17.9% (5)	3.13	28
Comments:								11
answered question								28
skipped question								25

10. If you would like to be contacted in order to provide additional feedback on this survey, participate in an interview in order to provide insight to perspectives not captured in this survey, or are interested in the results of this research project please provide an email address that you can be contacted.

	Response Count
	13
answered question	13
skipped question	40

11. If you are aware of other individuals who have insights relevant to this survey and whose participation would benefit this research project, please provide their name(s) and contact information.

	Response Count
	5
answered question	5
skipped question	48

Page 2, Q1. During post-conflict operations there are a variety of actors. Military and the NGO community provide the majority of the personnel acting in these environments. There are arguments for and against increasing the role of the military in these environments. Arguments for increasing the military...

1	Not essential, but certainly can enhance ease coordination issues	Aug 15, 2011 5:00 AM
2	Roles of the military should be clearly defined for post-conflict operations. The primary role of the military during post-conflict operations should be in establishing and maintaining a secure environment for all stakeholders to be able to operate. The military has extensive support capabilities and experience, and these can be exploited to the benefit of all stakeholders. The duration of military involvement should be clearly defined and remain as short as possible to ensure that the military returns to its normal functions (protection of the sovereignty of its own country) opening up the humanitarian space to purely humanitarian actors and permitting life to return to normal as quickly as possible for people affected.	Aug 8, 2011 9:55 PM
3	The answer is highly dependent on the theater of operations. It's hard to get a	Aug 8, 2011 6:23 AM

Page 2, Q1. During post-conflict operations there are a variety of actors. Military and the NGO community provide the majority of the personnel acting in these environments. There are arguments for and against increasing the role of the military in these environments. Arguments for increasing the military...

	single answer to this question but on balance there is probably more cases where its true than false.	
4	this is very region/country dependent. in specific countries NGOs - DoD coordination can put the NGOs at risk from being associated with the DoD after the fact.	Aug 4, 2011 2:32 PM
5	The military should be prepared to respond if needed but used as a last resort. The military should work with the civilian government agencies on disaster preparedness and risk mitigation issues before the next natural disaster so the country is more resilient as a civil society and less reliant on military assets. National defense should remain as the primary function of the military.	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM
6	The military's role is to respond when requested by DOS, do it's mission (whatever mission that is) and leave. It's up to the impacted country and the DOS as to what that mission is.	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM
7	I think type of event and geography should play a role here. Every event is somewhat different.	Jul 26, 2011 12:27 PM
8	It's a team effort, both Military and NGO have important roles.	Jul 26, 2011 9:00 AM
9	I will send you my paper on coordination that I have just finished and will be published in PAR. Civ-mil coordination depends on the context.	Jul 26, 2011 8:51 AM
10	It depends. Military organisation and resources are very very useful, but the military mindset (which is sometimes angled towards conflict rather than cooperation) can seriously hinder some post-conflict recoveries.	Jul 26, 2011 8:48 AM
11	Do not forget that as a Federal entity, the military brings an almost limitless budget in its ability to respond.	Jul 26, 2011 8:10 AM
12	Question is unclear; does "conflict" assume US participation vs. Rwanda, for example? Depending upon scenario, urgency, mass suffering, etc., response would differ. Also makes a huge difference to me whether there is peace-keeping, peace-making, or an overall absence of hostilities, any of which influence exigent military involvement. Entirely separate, but equally valid question is whether mil should increase 'pre' conflict involvement to prevent.	Jul 24, 2011 7:37 PM
13	Military is more capable of controlling these type of operations.	Jul 19, 2011 7:57 AM
14	case by case issue... in post-conflict operations in particular sometimes the presence of the military as an actor in a humanitarian operation (as opposed to a peacekeeping operation) can be detrimental. At other times, the security and logistical capacity are required.	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
15	The military not only has transportation and communication equipment readily available, but also extra bodies ready to deploy on a moments notice.	Jul 14, 2011 8:38 AM
16	Depends on the context	Jul 14, 2011 7:42 AM
17	This depends a great deal on the nature of the "conflict".	Jul 13, 2011 10:52 PM
18	Not a well written question. You have too many confounding variables. What do	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

Page 2, Q1. During post-conflict operations there are a variety of actors. Military and the NGO community provide the majority of the personnel acting in these environments. There are arguments for and against increasing the role of the military in these environments. Arguments for increasing the military...

you mean by "should increase its involvement in this type of operation"??
Conflict operations or humanitarian operations?? Good questions are short and fairly concrete....there is both an art and science to survey questions. I know what you mean so answered it subjectively in that manner but with this you risk leading the answerer if the terms used as the subject you want the opinion on is not made clear. Are you familiar with Operation Provide Comfort and the reasons why General Jay Garner did so well with the NGOs...he did all you talk of but did not do the humanitarian side...to this day he strongly feels this is the best model for the military!

Page 2, Q2. Various offices within the Department of Defense have developed workshops, exercises, pamphlets, and publications in order to increase the military officer's knowledge of NGOs to facilitate better communication and interaction.

1	It is totally dependent on individuals involved and their awareness levels, Joint exercises are positively increasing awareness on both sides	Aug 15, 2011 5:00 AM
2	In my experience, many of the military officers do not have a clear understanding of the mandates of NGOs and the way that they are organized and function. Admittedly, the vast number of differing mandates, objectives, organizational structures and functioning makes it a mammoth task to try and prepare military officers for better interaction and communication with NGOs	Aug 8, 2011 9:55 PM
3	Just way too many people involved. Too much personnel rotation for it to happen consistently. Not part of core mission for most.	Aug 8, 2011 6:23 AM
4	Comms are changing and materials for training have a natural lag time. Not up to date.	Aug 4, 2011 5:53 PM
5	not 100% sure about the pamphlets as I've never seen them. Better communication is always a good idea. I do know OFDA teaches a JHOC course to better inform DoD personnel on USAID activities.	Aug 4, 2011 2:32 PM
6	Education and awareness training should be continuous because the humanitarian landscape changes with every large natural disaster response. There have been significant changes from the Indian Ocean Tsunami to Hurricane Katrina to Haiti Earthquake to Japan Tsunami. An occasional workshop or pamphlet is not sufficient to meet the needs of HADR preparedness. It needs to be incorporated into all joint exercises and small unit training.	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM
7	Most think that the "military" is still in control. There are many courses and pubs, but taking/or reading them takes time.	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM
8	Especially with the number of large natural disasters over the last few years.	Jul 26, 2011 12:27 PM
9	There is room for improvement.	Jul 26, 2011 9:00 AM

Page 2, Q2. Various offices within the Department of Defense have developed workshops, exercises, pamphlets, and publications in order to increase the military officer's knowledge of NGOs to facilitate better communication and interaction.

10	Training with and knowledge of NGOs should be mandatory for all officers.	Jul 26, 2011 8:10 AM
11	Now ask whether I believe that the NGOs/IGOs/POs provide an equally adequate level of prep.	Jul 24, 2011 7:37 PM
12	nothing beats experience	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
13	More interaction is much better....	Jul 13, 2011 10:52 PM
14	The Commanders do not seem to have the knowledge base as their junior officers do. And it is the Commander who makes the difference. There are exceptions but it is coinsoistency you are looking for. We found that it changed dramatically with every Commander who replaced the old one in Iraq and few if any knew the responsibilities under Art 55 & 56 of the GC.	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

Page 2, Q3. Many organizations host collaborative workshops that focus on the interaction between military and NGO participants. These workshops consist of lecture style briefings and small group activities that aim to increase understanding of both of the cultures.

1	Workshops are beneficial in introducing various actors and establishing a base rapport between participants. However joint exercises and joint trainings in responses would give a much bigger exposure to the way in which the different organizations function and operate. It will also give a better exposure to work ethos and work culture.	Aug 8, 2011 9:55 PM
2	It really depends on WHO hosts the workshop and HOW they work. NGOs need funding to attend; if that's not there, few of them can show up, even if they want to come.	Aug 4, 2011 5:53 PM
3	no experience with this	Aug 4, 2011 2:32 PM
4	In terms of workshop length, size matters... but only to some degree. More importantly the agenda and course modules must provide facilitated discussion on key topics and practical exercises to improve learning. The firehouse lecture format has limited value in raising understanding.	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM
5	You can only get someone away from work for a short period of time (both giving the course or attending the course) for	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM
6	Workshops are great, but if not used by the Military or NGOs, they do not assist in anyway.	Jul 27, 2011 4:17 AM
7	We can always do more, the challenge is balancing limited time.	Jul 26, 2011 8:16 PM
8	Workshop is only one piece, real world collaboration is the key.	Jul 26, 2011 12:27 PM
9	I am not currently in a position to judge. I also suspect that mil-led, civ-led, and	Jul 24, 2011 7:37 PM

Page 2, Q3. Many organizations host collaborative workshops that focus on the interaction between military and NGO participants. These workshops consist of lecture style briefings and small group activities that aim to increase understanding of both of the cultures.

	regional org-led workshops differ sufficiently that this might ought be asked from both angles.	
10	Joint training and exercises are more effective than lectures and workshops.	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
11	Don't know	Jul 14, 2011 7:42 AM
12	Depends on the nature of the exercise.	Jul 13, 2011 10:52 PM
13	The agenda and goals are set by the military	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

Page 2, Q4. The Department of Defense currently funds humanitarian exercises where NGO participation allows aid (medical, dental, infrastructure, and supplies) to be delivered to less developed countries. African Partnership, Cobra Gold, New Horizons, and Pacific Partnership are examples of these types of e...

1	The DoD can be a valuable asset in DR activities however there involvement should have a better engagement mechanism.	Aug 4, 2011 2:32 PM
2	These exercises combine simulated HADR scenario training with real world hands-on humanitarian assistance. Further integration of virtual and real HADR operations would enhance realism and response preparation.	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM
3	Each have their own reason for being there and they don't always work will together.	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM
4	Yes I agree although need to be careful as this could also read prepare military for future action in said country.	Jul 26, 2011 12:27 PM
5	AGREE at the tactical and operational levels. From my experiences, I disagree that they prepare mil officers at the theater-strategic level. Can we deliver stuff and conduct appendectomies? Yes. Do we adequately consider desired mid and long term effects such as making a local governor look incompetent or losing face? We don't generally think about it. How are we perceived by the recipients such that 'influence' them as much as we build some school for them (without it falling apart next year)? We don't plan or measure that well.	Jul 24, 2011 7:37 PM
6	This type of activity is definitely more effective but still limited in providing real cooperative experience akin to that utilized in a post-conflict operation.	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
7	Don't know; not familiar with exercises.	Jul 14, 2011 7:42 AM
8	The funding stream is too crucial. And the feedback from the NGOs if constructively critical is rarely heeded.	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

Page 2, Q5. The military has begun providing briefings, publishing handouts, pamphlets, and publications that describe the organizational structure of NGOs, common approaches towards problem solving, and recommendations on how to interact together.

1	have not read any material	Aug 15, 2011 5:00 AM
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Page 2, Q5. The military has begun providing briefings, publishing handouts, pamphlets, and publications that describe the organizational structure of NGOs, common approaches towards problem solving, and recommendations on how to interact together.

2	I have not had the opportunity to review these materials	Aug 8, 2011 9:55 PM
3	never seen any of the material	Aug 8, 2011 6:23 AM
4	I have not seen one of these handouts	Aug 5, 2011 6:36 AM
5	Have not seen these. Considering how diverse NGOs are, would have questions about how they are characterized--that's really tough to do.	Aug 4, 2011 5:53 PM
6	I always hear complaints on coordination	Aug 4, 2011 2:32 PM
7	Publication material must be combined with in-class training or field exercises to fully understand the challenges of HADR coordination.	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM
8	Only if they are read and followed.	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM
9	Have not seen any of these.	Jul 27, 2011 4:17 AM
10	I have not seen material	Jul 26, 2011 12:27 PM
11	Not every officer is exposed to post-conflict exercise environments and briefings and handouts are not always the most efficient.	Jul 26, 2011 8:10 AM
12	I have seen it - but no pamphlet replaces experience and face-to-face interaction.	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
13	Don't know; not familiar with the materials.	Jul 14, 2011 7:42 AM
14	Reading etc. is great, but exercises and application are better.	Jul 13, 2011 10:52 PM
15	The military AND the NGOs should be providing this material....	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

Page 2, Q6. The military funds a percentage of officers to attend graduate level courses that can focus on a variety of curricula. Some officers are offered opportunities to pursue social science degrees that may be effective in increasing an officer's preparedness for operations in a post-conflict environm...

1	Exposure to the social sciences at academic level could potentially increase the awareness of military officers and would afford greater exposure to similar educational backgrounds followed by many humanitarian practitioners.	Aug 8, 2011 9:55 PM
2	The social science problems are the key problems in today's conflict environments. Too often, we have engineers trying to solve social science problems, which is like having social scientists do the engineering. Outcomes have not been good.	Aug 4, 2011 5:53 PM
3	The idea of "any degree is ok" is a thing of the past. The military needs people who understand the complexities of social/cultural/political issues and advanced degrees in political science, sociology, psychology, geography, etc are valuable for military leadership in today's world.	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM

Page 2, Q6. The military funds a percentage of officers to attend graduate level courses that can focus on a variety of curricula. Some officers are offered opportunities to pursue social science degrees that may be effective in increasing an officer's preparedness for operations in a post-conflict environm...

4	Only if it's their mission.	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM
5	Some of the best military strategists that I know have social science degrees. *The* best post-conflict army officer that I know has an MA in Women's Studies (and keeps it a very well-hidden secret!), and I've often wondered if that's helped him a lot with his campaigns.	Jul 26, 2011 8:48 AM
6	Yes, but only in specific specialties, such as civil affairs. Equally important, as I have indicated above, is for officers to learn how to plan cooperative security activities with national partners in order to proactively help them strengthen themselves to prevent or protect or prevail	Jul 24, 2011 7:37 PM
7	This is more relevant in future because of conflicts in different poor countries and which need our military help to gain stability e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan and may be Libya etc	Jul 19, 2011 7:57 AM
8	can't hurt	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
9	The best senior officers come from these ranks...and future crises have NO military answer but will require military participation.	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

Page 2, Q7. Some sources suggests that regardless of education and previous military exercise experience, there is too much of a cultural difference between the two cultures that coordination will remain difficult until a method of bridging that difference is created.

1	Military officers working for an NGO may not be the best way to do this , although it would enhance coordination between the parties involved	Aug 15, 2011 5:00 AM
2	A large portion of the gap between the military and NGOs is created by ignorance and lack of understanding between the two distinct entities. This works both ways. Many within the NGO world see the military purely as an offensive force and identify the military as fighters. This perception is borne out of ignorance of the military system and military capabilities. Furthermore, many within the military do not understand to structures of NGOs which tend to be far less hierarchical than the military system	Aug 8, 2011 9:55 PM
3	I'd like to see exchanges on BOTH sides. We had embedded journalists. We have embedded NGOs on the Mercy Ships. More is possible.	Aug 4, 2011 5:53 PM
4	Nothing is impossible. Bridging communication gaps can happen but it takes time, effort, and patience. A sabbatical from military duty may not be the answer but certainly a Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SMEE) program could be a solution. We already do SMEEs with other foreign militaries and US government interagencies, so why not also do it with NGO/IOs and other civ-mil humanitarian partners?	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM
5	1. different missions cause you to think things different ways. 2. Not the mission of the military. that belongs to USAID.	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM
6	I do not think a sabbatical is necessary, I think there should be opportunities to	Jul 27, 2011 4:17 AM

Page 2, Q7. Some sources suggests that regardless of education and previous military exercise experience, there is too much of a cultural difference between the two cultures that coordination will remain difficult until a method of bridging that difference is created.

	become a liaison to support awareness and cooperation.	
7	NGOs should be invited to participate in military education and training. The recent Talisman Sabre 2011 is an excellent example of getting nGos tom participate fully in training.	Jul 26, 2011 8:16 PM
8	The sabbatical is an interesting idea, but this may not be the only way for an officer to gain an understanding of NGOs. Similarly, would it be possible to embed NGOs into some military training or teams? (I have experience in both worlds - I think it has helped me with both).	Jul 26, 2011 8:48 AM
9	Sabbaticals or direct liason officer billets with NGOs is a great idea.	Jul 26, 2011 8:10 AM
10	We and they will never be in bed together. However, continued work together enables collaboration and fewer collisions. Re: sabbaticals, consider the opposite; invite NGOs to work/plan/conduct ongoing liaison with us. It is already done. Question also assumes, perhaps naively, that NGOs would let us into their perimeter. Not all can afford to let on that impression to their recipients.	Jul 24, 2011 7:37 PM
11	Allow a flexible organizational interaction between military and NGOs. Learning from NGOs is great due to their reach all around the globe and acceptability in most of the societies.	Jul 19, 2011 7:57 AM
12	never say "ever" the NGO "mentality" is a bit insulting... but the concept of a sabbatical is a good one. The use of such language indicates that the idea hasn't yet reached a maturity level that indicates it should be executed on yet.	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
13	A reciprocal rtide-a-long effort would be best. Relatively short term, but can be very effective.	Jul 13, 2011 10:52 PM
14	For question 1:an Atwoods' PRISM article 1, No 3, pages 3-11, 2010.For question 2, few of these trained in that manner ever even get to be involved or in charge of these operations or decisions...you have to accept that hey may come back and state the military has no roile in these operations.	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

Page 2, Q8. The military officer promotion system is complicated and involves officers being categorized by their job function and compared to their peers.

1	I am not a part of the military system and as such can not comment on this statement	Aug 8, 2011 9:55 PM
2	no experience	Aug 4, 2011 2:32 PM
3	Post-conflict and HADR operations experience should not be a separate career field or promotion category. All officers need to be able to function in combat operations and operations other than war.	Aug 3, 2011 12:08 PM
4	1. If you are good enough, no matter what you have done, you will promote. You shouldn't be given extra credit for these types of missions. 2. Work for USAID! 3. there is a shortage of officers that know how to work with USAID.	Jul 27, 2011 9:27 AM

Page 2, Q8. The military officer promotion system is complicated and involves officers being categorized by their job function and compared to their peers.

5	There is an entire generation of Marines and Soldiers with this experience.	Jul 26, 2011 8:16 PM
6	I simply don't know enough about the US military experience to judge here (I am more familiar with UK military peacekeeping operations).	Jul 26, 2011 8:48 AM
7	All military officers, at some time, may be involved in a post-conflict operation and having the knowledge beforehand is a must have. Separating, or creating a branch or pipeline specific to disaster response, is not the answer.	Jul 26, 2011 8:10 AM
8	"Post-conflict operations" is too narrow a concept to be considered as an officer specialty. Hence CA officers.	Jul 24, 2011 7:37 PM
9	I'm not in the military, not qualified to comment on this.	Jul 14, 2011 10:16 AM
10	Don't know, no experience with this.	Jul 14, 2011 7:42 AM
11	Please understand we wrote a white paper suggesting exactly this immediately after Somalia in 1992!! Resisted everything even to form more CA units on the active duty side. Also, the CAP process does not bring into the process any experts until the COA is already cut in stone. Change the CAP process to meet the goals and objectives. I've written on this for years and never been heeded.	Jul 13, 2011 6:34 PM

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